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Abstract
We consider distributed optimization over orthogonal collision channels in spatial random access
networks. Users are spatially distributed and each user is in the interference range of a few other users.
Each user is allowed to transmit over a subset of the shared channels with a certain attempt probability.
We study both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. In the former, the goal of each user is to
maximize its own rate irrespective of the utilities of other users. In the latter, the goal is to achieve
proportionally fair rates among users. Simple distributed learning algorithms are developed to solve these
problems. The efficiencies of the proposed algorithms are demonstrated via both theoretical analysis
and simulation results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum scarcity along with the increasing demand for wireless communication have triggered
the development of efficient spectrum access schemes for wireless networks. A good overview
of the various dynamic spectrum access models for MAC can be found in [2]. In this paper we
focus on the open sharing model among users that acts as the basis for managing a spectral
region (e.g., WiFi, cognitive radio, sensor networks, and unlicensed band technology [2]).
Consider a spatial wireless network with N users sharing K collision channels. Each user is
in the interference range of a few (but not necessarily all) other users, referred to as neighbors
(e.g., when the distance between users is small they cause mutual interference). In the beginning
of each time slot, each user is allowed to transmit over M channels (1 ≤M ≤ K) with a certain
attempt probability (i.e., using the slotted-ALOHA protocol). If two or more neighbors transmit
simultaneously over the same channel, a collision occurs. In multi-channel systems, exploiting
the channel diversity plays an important role in designing effective channel allocation protocols.
The channel conditions are a function of both the inherent quality of each channel due to fading,
shadowing, etc., as well as the interference caused by the users that use the channel. Thus, it
is intuitive that users can improve performance by adaptively choosing channels with a higher
probability of being idle as well as higher capacity when idle. We are interested in finding a
channel allocation and attempt probabilities in a distributed manner so as to optimize certain
objectives in the network.
A. Game theory, Distributed Optimization, and Learning for Spectrum Access Protocols
Spectrum access protocols can be broadly classified into two classes: (i) protocols in which
users do not share information with each other, due to security or overhead considerations, and
(ii) protocols in which information is shared to achieve a common goal, such as in networks
which are controlled by a single provider. Achieving an effective channel allocation for the
spectrum access problem in a distributed manner requires users to adaptively adjust their actions
(i.e., select channels and attempt probabilities) based on local information about the current
state of the system. Thus, the first question of interest is whether the system keeps oscillating
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When users do not share information, a stable channel allocation may not be a system-wide
optimal solution (though it reduces the undesirable effects of frequent channel switching and
also demonstrated good performance in some network models and typical scenarios, as in [3]–
[5]). Thus, the second question of interest is whether small amounts of information sharing can
lead to a globally-optimal operating point.
Game theory provides a rich set of tools to analyze a dynamic behavior of a system when
entities (or players) in the system take actions to optimize a predefined objective. Thus, using
game theoretic models to analyze wireless networking protocols and algorithms, in which users
(i.e., players) adjust their strategies (e.g., attempt probabilities, transmission power, selected
channels, etc.) so as to optimize the system performance has been attracted much attention in
recent years. Related work on networking games can be found under a non-cooperative setting
in [5]–[24] and under a cooperative setting in [9], [11], [13], [14], [17]–[19], [24], [25]. Since
generally we are interested in networking protocols that require small amounts of information
sharing (if any) and distributed in nature, it is often desired to develop efficient distributed
learning and optimization methods to achieve the target solution.
B. Main Results
We first examine the case where users do not share information with each other. The achievable
rate of each user increases with its own attempt probability, when other attempt probabilities
are fixed. Thus, a natural approach to achieve a good operating point is to allow every user to
maximize its own rate under a constraint on the allowed attempt probability1 (where different
attempt probability constraints are used to prioritize different users in the network), referred to
as distributed rate maximization. Next, we summarize our main results in this respect. (i) In [5],
the special case of a fully connected network (i.e., all users are in the same interference range)
and M = 1 (i.e., each user is allowed to transmit over only one channel) was considered, and a
distributed algorithm was applied to solve the distributed rate maximization problem, in which
each user updates its strategy using its local channel state information (CSI) and by monitoring
the load over the channels. It was shown that any finite improvement path (not necessarily best-
1Similar approaches were applied in [5], [7], [15], all resulting with an individual rate and attempt probability for every user.
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updates its channel-selection strategy given the current system state, reaches an equilibrium in
the sense that no user can increase its rate by unilaterally changing its strategy. In this paper,
however, we consider a more general case where each user interferes only with its neighbors, and
M ≥ 1 (i.e., every user is allowed to transmit over multiple channels). Interestingly, we show that
cycles may occur under some improvement paths in this general model. To solve this problem,
we use the theory of best-response (BR) potential games, introduced by Voorneveld in 2000 [26].
In BR potential games, cycles may occur under some improvement paths, though no cycles occur
under a BR dynamics. We prove that the system dynamics can be formulated as a BR potential
game. This result constitutes an important contribution from a game theoretic perspective as well
as MAC design perspective, since it generalizes existing results on Nash equilibria (NE) in [5],
[27], [28] (see a more detailed discussion in Section I-C). (ii) Based on our analysis, we then
propose a distributed BR learning algorithm that solves the distributed rate maximization problem
and converges to an equilibrium in finite time. The convergence result described above requires a
coordination mechanism that enables users to update their actions sequentially. We then propose
a simpler mechanism that guarantees convergence as time increases even without coordination
among users (thus, users may update actions simultaneously). We further extend our convergence
result to cases where each user may have a different set of available resources, which captures
the situation of a hierarchical model as in cognitive radio networks (see Section III for details).
Thus, these results enable us to design MAC protocols for a wide range of practical system
models. (iii) Since multiple NEs may exist, we finally analyze the efficiency of the NEs that the
algorithm may converge to. It should be noted that very little is known about the efficiency of
the NEs under related models as considered in this paper, particularly when interference across
users forms a graph structure. A popular performance measure for a NE efficiency is the Price of
Anarchy (PoA), which is the ratio between the optimal performance and the worst equilibrium.
The PoA (with respect to the sum utility) has been analyzed in [29] under the special case of a
fully connected network (i.e., the interference graph is complete) and equal attempt probability
for all users. In this paper, we analyze performance at equilibrium on average rather than worst
case performance, which is useful particularly in the context of wireless networks since we
are generally interested in the expected performance of users in the long run. Specifically, it
is shown that under some mild conditions (see Section III-C for details), implementing the
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its performance (in terms of expected rate) as compared to a naive algorithm, in which users
choose channels for transmission randomly without performing congestion monitoring used to
adjust their strategies as proposed in this paper. Significant performance gain (more that 170%
improvement) is obtained under a low collision level.
Second, we focus on a cooperative setting, in which the goal is to achieve the optimal channel
allocation and attempt probabilities that attain proportionally fair rates in the network. When
K = 1 (i.e., a single channel case), users have no freedom to choose among different channels,
and the action of each user degenerates to setting the optimal attempt probability for transmission
over the single channel. Low-complexity algorithms have been developed in [30]–[32] under
various models of a single collision channel. In this paper, however, we address this question
for multi-channel networks (i.e., K ≥ 1) where every user is allowed to choose a single channel
for transmission (i.e., M = 1) among the K channels and to set the optimal attempt probability
for transmission over the channel2. Direct computation of the optimal channel allocation and
attempt probabilities that attain proportionally fair rates for the multi-channel ALOHA network
considered in this paper is a combinatorial optimization problem over a graph. Furthermore, it
requires a centralized solution that uses global information which is impractical in large-scale
networks. Next, we summarize our main results in this respect. (i) We study the problem from a
game theoretic perspective and develop a novel cooperative distributed algorithm based on log-
linear learning, referred to as noisy BR, to achieve the target solution in a distributed manner.
Specifically, at each iteration, using message exchanges between neighbors only, selected users
take actions with respect to a cooperative utility that balances between their own utilities and
the interference level they cause to their neighbors given the current system state. In noisy BR
dynamics, users play the BR that maximizes their cooperative utilities with high probability, while
suboptimal responses are taken with small probabilities to escape local maxima. We prove that
the proposed cooperative algorithm converges to the global proportional fairness solution with
high probability as time increases. Furthermore, we show that every Nash equilibrium attained
2Accessing a single-channels is often assumed due to hardware constraints or when it is desired to limit the congestion level
in high-loaded systems. It has been widely assumed in cognitive radio applications, WiFi, sensor networks, etc. It should be
noted, however, that developing a tractable optimal solution for the proportional fairness problem under the case where users
are allowed to access two or more channels at a time remains an open question.
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in the sense that proportionally fair rates are attained locally among all users sharing the same
channel. (ii) The proposed algorithm significantly simplifies the implementation as compared to
existing methods. First, it requires less amount of information sharing between nodes. Second,
synchronization in a neighborhood with respect to action updates is not required (see Section
I-C for a more detailed discussion on related works).
C. Related Work
Spectrum access and sharing have attracted much attention in past and recent years. We next
discuss related works that use game theoretic models, distributed optimization, and learning
techniques, some of them have been discussed in Sections I-A, I-B, and highlight the main
differences in the model, analysis and results obtained in this paper as compared to the related
existing studies.
ALOHA-based Protocols and Cross Layer Optimization. ALOHA-based protocols have
been widely used in wireless communication primarily because of their ease of implementation
and their random nature. Related work on ALOHA-based protocols can be found in [5]–[7],
[15], [24], [33]–[38] for fully connected networks and in [28], [30]–[32], [39]–[42] for spatial
networks. Stability of a selfish behavior dynamics in a single-channel ALOHA system was
studied in [6]. Equilibria under rate demands have been analyzed in [7], [15]. In this paper,
however, we focus on the multi-channel case. In [5], [28], the multi-channel ALOHA case was
studied, where M = 1. In [28], the authors have developed a distributed algorithm, in which a
mixed strategy was applied to obtain local information in a spatially distributed network. In [5],
a pure strategy was applied, where the local information was obtained by sensing the spectrum in
a fully connected network. When M = 1, the log-rate of each user under an ALOHA model can
be expressed as a linear combination of its inherent log-rate minus the log-interference caused
by its neighbors (i.e., an affine function, see (3) for details). As a result, due to the monotonicity
of the logarithm, analysis of Nash equilibria when M = 1 under the non-cooperative setting
follows by applying a variation of the ordinal potential function introduced in [27] for affine
utilities. Thus, any improvement path (not necessarily best-response) across users, in which at
each iteration the rate of a user increases when it updates its channel-selection strategy given the
current system state (i.e., sequential updating), reaches an equilibrium in the sense that no user
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the case where M ≥ 1, in which cycles may occur under some improvement paths and the
dynamics does not obey an ordinal potential function. Thus, our Nash equilibria analysis using
the theory of best-response potential games (as described in Section I-B) generalizes the Nash
equilibria results obtained in [5], [27], [28]. It also generalizes the equilibria results in [43] (that
assumes that each node contributes equally to the congestion of a resource) due to different
attempt probabilities across users considered here. It should be noted that avoiding simultaneous
updates across users can be done by allowing each user to draw a random backoff time and
update its strategy when the backoff time expires. However, we will show convergence of the
algorithm even without this mechanism. Stability of multi-channel ALOHA systems was studied
in [33], [34], [44], [45]. In [39], [41], spatial single-channel ALOHA networks have been studied
under interference channels using stochastic geometry. Opportunistic ALOHA schemes that use
cross layer MAC/PHY techniques, in which the design of Medium Access Control (MAC) is
integrated with physical layer channel information to improve the spectral efficiency, have been
studied under both the single-channel [15], [36], [41] and multi-channel [5], [24], [36], [37]
cases. Other related studies considered recently opportunistic carrier sensing in a cross-layer
design [4], [46]–[49]. A cross-layer MAC/PHY methodology is used in this paper to design
efficient distributed algorithms for the problems under study.
Distributed Learning and Optimization for a Fair Spectrum Sharing. Achieving pro-
portionally fair rates in spatial random access networks (which considered in this paper under
the cooperative setting as described in Section I-B) has been studied under the single collision
channel case (K = 1) in [30]–[32] and the multi collision channel case (K ≥ 1, M = 1) in
[42] (as considered in this paper). The algorithm developed in [42] uses a Gibbs sampler over
local maxima that converges to a global maximum as time increases. The algorithm requires
information sharing between nodes up to second neighborhood at each iteration. It further requires
perfect synchronization in a neighborhood with respect to action updates in the sense that once
a node updates its strategy all its neighbors must update their strategies accordingly. In this
paper, however, we develop an algorithm that requires information sharing between a single
node and its neighbors only (i.e., first neighborhood) at each iteration, and synchronization in a
neighborhood with respect to action updates is not required. Once a node updates its strategy,
its neighbors may or may not update their strategies. Thus, convergence of our scheme is robust
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is based on log-linear learning techniques (see [50], [51] for more details on the theory of log-
linear learning), and use a game theoretic perspective to analyze the algorithm’s performance.
Similar idea for using altruistic plus selfish components in the algorithm design under a channel
and cell selection problem has been identified in [40], where global optimum was obtained via
Gibbs sampler. The MAC layer protocol between users was assumed given and the question of
interest is concerned with the interference mitigation between cells which are co-exist in the
same frequency bands. Furthermore, the objective aimed at minimizing the minimum potential
delay (and not obtaining proportionally fair rates as considered in this paper). On algorithm
development, the model in [40] requires each user to computes the aggregate utility of its own
and all users in the network that communicate with the same AP (via a utility of the form of
1/f(SNR)). Consequently, the resulting algorithm in [40] is fundamentally different from the
one developed in this paper under the cooperative setting. Other related studies that use log-linear
learning and Gibbs sampling techniques under different spectrum access models and objectives
can be found in [52]–[56].
Game Theoretic Models for Communication Systems. Cooperative game theoretic opti-
mization has been studied under frequency flat interference channels in the SISO [11], [13],
MISO [17], [18] and MIMO cases [14]. The frequency selective interference channels case has
been studied in [9], [19]. The collision channels case has been studied under a fully-connected
network and without information sharing between users in [24], where the global optimum was
attained under the asymptotic regime (i.e., as the number of users N approaches infinity) and the
i.i.d assumption on the channel quality. In this paper, however, we study distributed optimization
of the user rates under the cooperative setting for spatial networks where information sharing
between neighbors is allowed. We show that proportionally fair rates are attained for any number
N ≥ 1 of users without any assumption on the network topology or channel distribution.
Other related game theoretic models have been used in cellular, OFDMA, and 5G systems
[57]–[61]. In [57], the authors focused on a power control model, where exact and ordinal poten-
tial game models have been investigated. In [58], a joint uplink/downlink subcarrier allocation
in OFDMA systems has been investigated via a two-sided stable matching game formulation.
In [59], the interference mitigation problem in the downlink of multicell networks via base
station coordination has been studied via a potential game framework. In [60], the authors
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self-optimization problem has been studied for the downlink operation of dense femtocell net-
works via a noncooperative exact potential game formulation. This paper, however, considers a
fundamentally different model, where communication is over collision channels (i.e., interfer-
ences are caused by the MAC layer’s attempt probabilities), and the optimization variables are
channel allocation and attempt probabilities. From a game theoretic perspective, we show that
some improvement paths may result in cycles under the noncooperative setting (thus, the game
dynamics does not obey exact or ordinal potential functions). Instead, we formulate the game
as a best-response potential game, where it is shown that best-response dynamics converges.
Spectrum Access as a Graph Coloring Problem. Another set of related works is concerned
with modeling the spectrum access problem as a graph coloring problem, in which users and
channels are represented by vertices and colors, respectively. Thus, coloring vertices such that
two adjacent vertices do not share the same color is equivalent to allocating channels such that
interference between neighbors is being avoided (see [62]–[65] and references therein for related
works). However, the problem considered in this paper is different since we mainly focus on
the case where the number of users is much larger than the number of channels (thus, coloring
the graph may be infeasible). Furthermore, in our case users may select more than one channel,
and may prefer some channels over others, as well as optimize their rates with respect to the
attempt probability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the network model.
In Sections III and IV we consider the noncooperative and cooperative settings, respectively. In
Section V we provide simulation results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a wireless network consisting of a set N = {1, 2, ..., N} of users (or transceiver
links) and a set of K = {1, 2, ..., K} of shared channels (where typically N > K). We focus
on a spatial wireless network, where each user is in the interference range of a few (but not
necessarily all) other users. We assume symmetric interference ranges for all users in the sense
that user n is in user r’s interference range only if user r is in user n’s interference range for all
n, r ∈ N . We refer to users in the same interference range as neighbors, and define In ⊆ (N \n)
as the set of user n’s neighbors (i.e., the interference range equals the communication range when
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considering communication between neighbors). We assume that users are backlogged, i.e., all
N users always have packets to transmit. In the beginning of each time slot, each user (say n)
is allowed to transmit over M channels (1 ≤ M ≤ K) with a certain attempt probability (i.e.,
using the slotted-ALOHA protocol). Let KM be the set of all M-element subsets of K (i.e.,
KM is the set of all channel-selection strategies that a user can choose). Let σn = (kn, pn) be
the strategy of user n, where kn = {kn,i}Mi=1 ∈ KM denotes the set of chosen channels and
0 ≤ pn ≤ 1 denotes the attempt probability of user n. Thus, when user n decides to transmit
(which occurs with probability pn) it uses all the channels in kn for transmission. We define σ
as the strategy profile for all users, and σ−n as the strategy profile for all users except user n.
The topology of the interference model can be represented by an undirected graph G = (N , E),
where the set of users are represented by the vertices and the interference relationships between
users are represented by the set of edges E. An edge (n, r) ∈ E means that users n and r are in
the same interference range. The set of user n’s neighbors In is represented by vertices directly
connected to vertex n excluding vertex n itself. An illustration is given in Fig. 4 in Section V.
We consider transmissions over orthogonal collision channels. Thus, transmission by user n
over channel kn,i is successful only if no user r ∈ In transmits over channel kn,i in the same time-
slot. However, if user n and at least one more user in In transmit simultaneously over channel
kn,i in the same time slot, a collision occurs. The achievable rate of user n over channel k given
that a transmission is successful, referred to as collision-free utility, is denoted by un(k) ≥ 0
(i.e., Shannon capacity). We consider long-term rates where un(k) remain fixed across time slots
during the running-time of the algorithms (e.g., mean-rate, or slow-fading effect). It should be
noted that the algorithm dynamics and convergence analysis hold under any network topology
and when rates (i.e., channel gains) may be different across users and frequencies. However,
equal channels are required for purposes of analysis in Section III-C.
Define the success probability of user n on channel k, given the strategy profile of other users,
as follows:
vn(k, σ−n) ,
∏
i∈In
(1− pi)
1i(k) , (1)
where 1i(k) = 1 if k ∈ ki and 1i(k) = 0 otherwise. Hence, the expected rate of user n over
channel kn,i is given by:
rn (kn,i, pn, σ−n) = pnun(kn,i)vn(kn,i, σ−n) . (2)
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Note that the log-rate of user n over channel kn,i is given by
log rn (kn,i, pn, σ−n) = log (un(kn,i)pn)− In(kn,i, σ−n), (3)
where In(k, σ−n) is referred to as the log-interference function and is given by:
In(k, σ−n) , − log vn(k, σ−n) =
∑
i∈In
log
(
1
1− pi
)
1i(k) . (4)
Note that In(k, σ−n) can be viewed as the log-interference that user n experiences over channel
k caused by its neighbors that transmit over the same channel. Finally, the expected rate of user
n is given by:
Rn (σ) ,
M∑
i=1
rn (kn,i, pn, σ−n) . (5)
Throughout the paper, we will develop distributed algorithms to optimize certain objectives in
the network. Theoretically, convergence analysis often requires users to update their strategies
in a sequential manner. Avoiding simultaneous updates in communication systems is often done
by allowing each user to draw a random backoff time and update its strategy when its backoff
time expires (as discussed in Section I-C). For simplicity, we will assume a similar mechanism
here. Specifically, it is assumed that users hold a global clock and may update their strategies
only at times t1, t2, ..., referred to as updating times. At each updating time, every user draws a
backoff time from a continuous uniform distribution over the range [0, B] for some B > 0. A
user whose backoff time expires may broadcast a pilot signal to its neighbors, indicating that its
strategy has been updated or start transmitting its data and its neighbors can sense activity. Then,
all its neighbors keep their strategies fixed until the next updating time. Note that neighbors will
not update their strategies simultaneously, and the time interval for data transmissions is set to
be higher than B. At each updating time, we refer to users that update their strategies as active
users. The set of active users is denoted by Na (which is time-varying across updating times).
In Tables I, II (Step 3) we refer to this mechanism as a selection of active users. It should be
noted, however, that convergence of the algorithm discussed in Section III-B will be shown even
without this coordination mechanism.
III. DISTRIBUTED RATE MAXIMIZATION:
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A NON-COOPERATIVE SETTING
In this section we consider the case where every user (say n) maximizes its own rate given
the current system state under a constraint Pn on its allowed attempt probability, i.e., pn ≤ Pn
where Pn < 1 (see Section I-B for motivation of this problem). Since maximizing the rate given
the current system state results in a transmission with the maximal allowed attempt probability
Pn, the strategy for user n degenerates to choosing the subset of channels kn that maximizes its
own rate under a fixed attempt probability Pn. As a result, the strategy played by user n given a
fixed strategy profile of other users σ−n is given by σn = (k∗n, Pn), where k∗n =
{
k∗n,i
}M
i=1
solves
the following distributed rate maximization problem3:
k∗n = arg max
kn∈KM
Rn (σ) s.t. pn = Pn . (6)
Since Rn (σ) = pn
∑M
i=1 un(kn,i)vn(kn,i, σ−n) and pn = Pn in (6) is a constant independent of
kn, it suffices to solve:
k∗n = arg max
kn∈KM
M∑
i=1
un(kn,i)vn(kn,i, σ−n) . (7)
For every user n let
{
k∗n,1, k
∗
n,2, ..., k
∗
n,K
}
be a permutation of {1, ..., K} such that:
un(k
∗
n,1)vn(k
∗
n,1, σ−n) ≥ un(k
∗
n,2)vn(k
∗
n,2, σ−n)
≥ · · · ≥ un(k∗n,K)vn(k
∗
n,K, σ−n) .
(8)
Following (7), the channel-selection strategy that solves (6) at each given updating time is given
by:
k∗n =
{
k∗n,1, k
∗
n,2, ..., k
∗
n,M
}
. (9)
Note that in practical systems, user n holds an estimate of un(k) (from pilot signals for
instance). On the other hand, complete information about other user strategies is not required.
Monitoring the channels to obtain vn(k, σ−n) for all k is sufficient to make a decision4. Hence,
3For ease of presentation, we assume continuous random rates un(k) to guarantee a uniqueness of the maximizer. Otherwise,
channels with the same rate can be ordered arbitrarily.
4Note that the number of idle time slots and busy time slots can be used to estimate the success probability. Monitoring the
channels can be done by the receiver (which can sense the spectrum and send this information to the transmitter). Another way
is to monitor the null period by the transmitter as in cognitive radio systems. Any attempt to access channel k by one user or
more results in identifying channel k as busy.
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for purposes of analysis in this section we assume that every user n estimates vn(k, σ−n) perfectly
(i.e., monitors the channels for a sufficient time). In Section V, simulation results demonstrate
strong performance of the proposed algorithm in practical systems under estimation errors. Next,
we examine a distributed algorithm that uses un(k), vn(k, σ−n) to solve the distributed rate
maximization problem.
A. Best-Response Potential Game Formulation
The system dynamics can be viewed as a non-cooperative game, in which every user sequen-
tially updates its strategy to increase its rate given the current system state irrespective of other
users’ rates, referred to as the Distributed Rate Maximization (DRM) game. The strategy k∗n that
solves (6) represents a best-response (BR) strategy since a user chooses k∗n that maximizes its rate
given the current system state. On the other hand, switching from strategy kn to k′n to increase
the rate (but not maximizing it) such that Rn(k′n, Pn, σ−n) > Rn(kn, Pn, σ−n) is called a better-
response. A system is in an equilibrium when users cannot increase their rates by unilaterally
changing their strategy.
Definition 1: A Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP) for the DRM game is a strategy profile σ∗ =
(σ∗n, σ
∗
−n), where k∗n′ ∈ KM , p∗n′ = Pn′ for all n′ ∈ N , such that
Rn
(
σ∗n, σ
∗
−n
)
≥ Rn(σ˜n, σ
∗
−n)
∀n , ∀σ˜n = (k˜n, Pn) , k˜n ∈ KM .
(10)
A game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every improvement path, in which a
sequence of better-responses are executed by users sequentially, is finite. Clearly, a game with
FIP converges to a NEP in finite time under any better-response dynamics. In what follows we
use the theory of potential games to analyze the convergence of the BR dynamics to a NEP
under the DRM game. In potential games, the incentive of users to switch strategies can be
expressed by a global potential function. A NEP for the game is reached at any local maximum
of the potential function. Next, we define a class of related potential games to the DRM game
at hand.
Definition 2 ( [26]): The DRM game is referred to as a best-response potential game if there
is a best-response potential function φ : σ → R such that for every user n and for every
σ−n = {ki, pi}i 6=n, where ki ∈ KM , pi = Pi, the following holds:
arg max
kn∈KM
Rn(kn, Pn, σ−n) = arg max
kn∈KM
φ(kn, Pn, σ−n) . (11)
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Differing from other classes of potential games (e.g., exact, ordinal) which have the FIP, cycles
may occur in BR potential games under some improvement paths. Nevertheless, no cycle occurs
when playing BR dynamics since the potential function increases at any BR. In the DRM game,
some improvement paths may result in cycles when M > 1, as shown in Appendix VII-A.
Nevertheless, the following theorem shows that the DRM game is a best-response potential
game.
Theorem 1: The DRM game is a best-response potential game, with the following best-response
potential function:
φ(σ) =
N∑
n=1
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
M∑
i=1
(
log un(kn,i)−
In(kn,i, σ−n)
2
)
.
(12)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix VII-B.
Note that a variation of (12) was shown to be an ordinal potential function for a game with affine
utilities in [27] (i.e., any improvement path reaches an equilibrium in finite time). Theorem 1,
however, shows that a best-response dynamics under the DRM game reaches an equilibrium in
finite time although cycles may occur under some improvement paths.
Remark 1: It should be noted that when the constraints on the attempt probabilities satisfies:
Pn(k) ∈ {0, Pn} for all k, n, each user selects channels among the set of channels, in which
Pn(k) = Pn > 0. Thus, it can be verified that Theorem 1 holds under this more general case as
well. This scenario captures the situation of a hierarchical model (as in cognitive radio networks).
An example of such attempt probability constraints is depicted in Fig. 1, where user 1 (high-
priority) is allowed to transmit over white spaces and 2.4GHz bands, while user 2 (low-priority)
is allowed to transmit over 2.4GHz band only.
B. Best-Response Algorithm for Distributed Rate Maximization
Following Theorem 1, we propose a non-cooperative BR algorithm to solve the constrained
distributed rate maximization problem in the spatial multi-channel ALOHA networks, dubbed
BR for Distributed Rate Maximization (BR-DRM) algorithm. We initialize the algorithm by a
simple solution where every user picks the M channels with the highest collision-free utility
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Fig. 1. An illustration of attempt probability constraints in a scenario of a hierarchical model in cognitive radio networks. User
1 (high-priority) is allowed to transmit over white spaces and 2.4GHz bands, while user 2 (low-priority) is allowed to transmit
over 2.4GHz band only.
un(k). In the learning process step, each user monitors the load on the channels to obtain
vn(k, σ−n) for all k (see the beginning of Section III for more details on the monitoring process).
Then, at each updating time the selected active users (selected according to the mechanism
described in Section II) update their strategies by selecting the channels according to (9).
When users cannot increase their rates by unilaterally changing their strategy, an equilibrium
is obtained. The BR-DRM Algorithm is given in Table I. The set of active users in Step 3
is determined according to the distributed mechanism described in Sec. II. In Steps 5 − 7 the
user selects the channels for transmission based on the estimated load. Users repeat updating
strategies until their rates converge. During the running time of the algorithm the loads on
the channels are changed dynamically and affect user decisions across time. Convergence is
guaranteed following Theorem 1, since the best response potential function is upper bounded
(by φ(σ) ≤M∑Nn=1 log( 11−Pn
)
maxk log (un(k))) and any local maxima is a NEP for the game
(since no user can increase its rate by unilaterally changing its strategy). It should be noted that
convergence in finite time of BR dynamics in the DRM game is preserved as long as all active
users are not neighbors (since the log-interference that user n experiences In(k, σ−n) is affected
only by users in In, thus we assume that no simultaneous updates occur among neighbors) as
designed by the mechanism that selects the active users described in Section II.
Corollary 1: Assume that users update their strategy according to the mechanism described
in Section II. Then, the BR-DRM algorithm, given in Table I, converges to a NEP in finite time.
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Next, we examine the case where simultaneous updates across neighbors may occur. An
example for this case is when a simpler mechanism is applied where each user (say n) updates its
strategy with a given probability 0 < qn < 1, referred to as a probabilistic mechanism. Another
example is when communication errors between neighbors result in simultaneous updates. In
such cases, convergence to a NEP is achieved with high probability as time increases.
Proposition 1: Assume that users update their strategy according to the probabilistic mecha-
nism. Then, the BR-DRM algorithm converges to a NEP with probability 1 as time approaches
infinity.
Proof: Let pmin = minn qn, pmax = maxn qn. Since the DRM game is a potential game,
any NEP can be reached in finite time when users update their strategy in a sequential manner
(i.e., when no simultaneous updates occur) starting from any point. Thus, there exists a finite
integer U which is the maximal number of updates needed to reach any NEP from any starting
point.
Next, consider the updating times tℓ·U−U+1, tℓ·U−U+2, ..., tℓ·U for ℓ = 1, 2, .... Note that given
any strategy profile σ(tℓ·U−U ) by time tℓ·U−U , there exists a sequence of sequential strategy updates
across users during the updating times tℓ·U−U+1, tℓ·U−U+2, ..., tℓ·U such that the system surely
reaches an equilibrium by time tℓ·U . Since the probability for each such update is greater than
pmin (1− pmax)
N−1 (i.e., the desired user updates its strategy and all other N−1 users’ strategies
are remain fixed), the probability to reach an equilibrium at time tℓ·U starting at time tℓ·U−U+1 is
greater than
[
pmin (1− pmax)
N−1
]U
for all ℓ = 1, 2, ... . Similarly, the probability that the system
does not reach a NEP at time tℓ·U starting at time tℓ·U−U+1 is less than 1−
[
pmin (1− pmax)
N−1
]U
.
Since this bound is independent of the starting point, the probability that the system does not
reach a NEP at time tℓ·U is less than
[
1−
[
pmin (1− pmax)
N−1
]U]ℓ
. Thus, letting ℓ → ∞
completes the proof.
C. Efficiency of the BR-DRM Algorithm
The convergence analysis provided in Section III-A implies that the BR-DRM algorithm
converges to a stable channel allocation. However, this stable operating point may not be a
system-wide optimal solution. Though simulation results demonstrate good performance of the
algorithm in terms of achievable user rate, in this section we provide theoretical performance
guarantee of the performance that can be expected by implementing BR-DRM. We examine the
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TABLE I
BR-DRM ALGORITHM
1) Initialize
each user (say n) estimates un(k) for all k, and
selects the M channels with the highest un(k)
2) repeat (at each updating time)
3) Na ← updated set of active users
4) for n ∈ Na do
5) estimate vn(k, σ−n) for all k
6) k∗n ←
{
k∗n,1, k
∗
n,2, ..., k
∗
n,M
}
by (9)
7) (kn, pn)← (k∗n, Pn)
8) end for
10) until all rates converge
performance gain under BR-DRM (i.e., when users apply distributed learning of the dynamic
load to update their strategies) as compared to a naive algorithm, in which every user chooses
a channel randomly and does not apply the learning process to update its strategy. For purposes
of analysis, we consider the case where the network forms a |I|-regular graph, and every user
experiences equal rates for all channels (when channels are free), i.e., un = un(k) = un(k′)
for all k, k′. We set Pn = K/ (|I|+ 1) for all n (which captures proportional fairness among
users as will be discussed in subsequent sections). We focus on the more interesting case where
|I| + 1 > K (thus, best response is used to mitigate interference among neighbors) and for the
ease of presentation assume that (|I|+ 1) /K ∈ Z.
Theorem 2: Assume that the assumptions presented in this section hold. Let RBR−DRMn ,
RNaiven be the rate of user n achieved by the BR-DRM and naive algorithms, respectively. Then,
the ratio between the user rate achieved by the BR-DRM algorithm and the user rate achieved
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by the naive algorithm is given by:
RBR−DRMn
RNaiven
≥ η ,
(
1− K
|I|+1
) |I|+1
K
−1
(
1− 1|I|+1
)|I| . (13)
Proof: To prove the theorem we first lower bound the achievable expected rate of user n
under BR-DRM. Let In(k) be the set of user n’s neighbors who select channel k. Assume to the
contrary that BR-DRM has converged and that user n selects channel k1 and |In(k1)| > |I|/K.
Since there exists a channel k2 with |In(k2)| ≤ |I|/K (and thus higher rate can be achieved over
channel k2), playing best response by user n cannot be terminated by selecting channel k1 which
contradicts the assumption. Since this argument holds for every user in the system, and the BR-
DRM converges (in a finite time) by Theorem 1, then In(k∗n) ≤ |I|/K for all n in equilibrium,
where k∗n is the selected channel by user n at equilibrium. As a result, the achievable rate of
user n is given by:
RBR−DRMn ≥ un
K
|I|+ 1
·
(
1−
K
|I|+ 1
) |I|+1
K
−1
∀n. (14)
Next, we compute the expected user rate achieved by the naive algorithm where every user
chooses a channel randomly without using CSI. Assume that user n transmits over channel k.
Note that channel k is selected by all other users with a probability 1/K and then every user that
picks channel k actually transmits over it with a probability K/ (|I|+ 1). Therefore, the expected
rate of user n on channel k is: Rn(k) = un K|I|+1
(
1− 1
K
· K|I|+1
)|I|
. Since every channel is selected
with equal probability 1/K, the expected rate of user n achieved by the naive algorithm is given
by:
RNaiven = un
K
|I|+ 1
(
1−
1
K
·
K
|I|+ 1
)|I|
. (15)
Hence, the ratio between the expected user rate achieved by the BR-DRM algorithm and the
expected user rate achieved by the naive algorithm is given by:
RBR−DRMn
RNaiven
≥ η ,
(
1− K|I|+1
) |I|+1
K
−1
(
1− 1|I|+1
)|I| ∀n. (16)
Remark 2: Note that lim |I|+1
K
→1
(
1− K
|I|+1
) |I|+1
K
−1
= 1 and that both numerator and denom-
inator of η approach e−1 as |I| increases and K is fixed. Thus, it can be verified that η is
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bounded by 1 ≤ η ≤ e, where η approaches 1 as |I| approaches infinity and K is fixed, and η
approaches e when |I|+1 = K and K approaches infinity. Thus, Theorem 2 provides an insight
about the performance gain that can be expected by the BR-DRM algorithm. Specifically, under
the system model considered in this section, implementing BR-DRM guarantees that every user
in the system improves its performance (in terms of expected rate) as compared to the naive
algorithm. Significant performance gain is obtained when |I|+1 = K (i.e., in situations of a low
collision level). In this case, we have η = (1− 1/K)1−K . Thus, the user rate increases by more
than 100% for K ≥ 2 (since the performance gain is greater than η = 2) and more than 170%
for very large K (since the performance gain is greater than η ≈ e) by implementing BR-DRM
as compared to the naive algorithm.
IV. ACHIEVING GLOBAL PROPORTIONAL FAIRNESS:
A COOPERATIVE SETTING
Instead of solving a distributed rate maximization as done in the preceding section, here we
are interested in developing a distributed algorithm that attains proportionally fair rates in the
network (using information sharing between neighbors only). Cooperation in this section refers
to a social behavior (by designing a social utility function for each user) that can lead to a
globally-optimal operating point. Nevertheless, the model is still cast as a non-cooperative game
in the sense that users act with respect to their own social utility. We consider the case where
M = 1. Thus, kn ∈ K is a natural number denoting a single channel chosen by user n. Formally,
the problem is to find a strategy profile that maximizes the sum-log rate in the network:
σ∗ = arg max
{kn∈K,0≤pn≤1}
N
n=1
N∑
n=1
logRn (σ) . (17)
The above optimization problem (17) was first formulated in [30] under a variation of the
ALOHA model considered in this paper for single-channel systems (i.e., K = 1) and equal rates
for all links. In consistence with the previous section, it is convenient to view each user in the
network as a player that takes actions with respect to a local utility when solving a discrete
optimization problem, as suggested in [51]. In what follows we address this problem (17) from
a game theoretic perspective under the multi-channel case.
DRAFT
20
A. Exact Potential Game Formulation
In Section III we have shown that any NEP of the DRM game is a local maximum of its
potential function (12). In this section, however, we are interested in finding a global maximum
of (17) since it attains a global proportional fairness in the network.
Let In(k) be the set of user n’s neighbors that transmit over channel k, and let
Fn(kn, pn, σ−n)
, log (un(kn)pn)− In(kn, σ−n)− log
(
1
1− pn
)
|In(kn)| ,
(18)
be the cooperative utility (or fair utility) for user n. Note that the cooperative utility balances
between individual and social utilities. The term log (un(kn)pn)− In(kn, σ−n) is the individual
utility for user n, where log
(
1
1−pn
)
|In(k)| represents the aggregated log-interference that user
n causes to its neighbors. Throughout this section it is assumed that user n can compute its
cooperative utility when making decisions (see a discussion on a practical implementation in
section IV-C). We refer to this game as the fairness game.
Next, we show that the fairness game is an exact potential game where
∑
n logRn (σ) is a
potential function of the game.
Definition 3 ( [66]): The fairness game is called an exact potential game if there is an exact
potential function φ : σ → R such that for every user n and for every σ−n = {ki, pi}i 6=n, where
ki ∈ K, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, the following holds:
Fn(σ
(2)
n , σ−n)− Fn(σ
(1)
n , σ−n)
= φ(σ(2)n , σ−n)− φ(σ
(1)
n , σ−n) ,
∀σ(1)n = (k
(1)
n , p
(1)
n ), σ
(2)
n = (k
(2)
n , p
(2)
n ) ,
k
(1)
n , k
(2)
n ∈ K , 0 ≤ p
(1)
n , p
(2)
n ≤ 1 .
(19)
Theorem 3: The fairness game is an exact potential game, with the following exact potential
function:
φ(σ) =
N∑
n=1
logRn (σ) . (20)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix VII-C.
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B. Nash Equilibrium of the fairness game
Since the fairness game is an exact potential game with an upper bounded potential function
(by φ(σ) < ∑Nn=1maxk log (un(k))), any BR dynamics converges to a NEP in the sense that
users cannot increase their cooperative utility by unilaterally changing their strategies. However,
any local maximum of the potential function (20) is a NEP of the game. Thus, here we first
characterize the NEPs’ structure of the fairness game. In Section IV-C we will use this result to
develop an algorithm that achieves the best NEP in the sense that the global maximum of (20)
is attained.
Definition 4: A Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP) for the fairness game is a strategy profile
σ∗ = (σ∗n, σ
∗
−n), where k∗i ∈ K, 0 ≤ p∗i ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N , such that
Fn
(
σ∗n, σ
∗
−n
)
≥ Fn(σ˜n, σ
∗
−n)
∀n , ∀σ˜n = (k˜n, p˜n) , k˜n ∈ K , 0 ≤ p˜n ≤ 1 .
(21)
Theorem 4: A strategy profile σ∗ = {k∗n, p∗n}
N
n=1 is a NEP for the fairness game if k∗n ∈ K,
p∗n =
1
|In(k∗n)|+ 1
for all n ∈ N .
Proof: Fix a strategy profile σ−n and assume that user n updates its strategy. To prove the
theorem it suffices to show that for all n and any σ−n the following holds:
σ∗n =
(
k∗n, p
∗
n =
1
|In(k∗n)|+ 1
)
= arg max
kn∈K,0≤pn≤1
Fn(kn, pn, σ−n)
= arg max
kn∈K,0≤pn≤1
[log un(kn) + log pn
−In(kn, σ−n)− log
(
1
1− pn
)
|In(kn)|
]
.
Note that for any kn ∈ K the terms log un(kn), In(kn, σ−n) are independent of pn. Thus, it
suffices to show that for any given kn the following holds:
1
|In(kn)|+ 1
= arg max
0≤pn≤1
log pn + log (1− pn) |In(kn)| .
The case where |In(kn)| = 0 is straightforward since user n does not interfere with other users
(setting pn = 1 maximizes the RHS by defining 0 · log 0 = 0). Thus, we consider the case where
|In(kn)| ≥ 1. Note that the function log pn+log (1− pn) |In(kn)| is strictly concave function of
pn (for 0 ≤ pn ≤ 1). Therefore, it has a unique global maximum. differentiating with respect to
DRAFT
22
pn and equating to zero yields p∗n = 1|In(kn)|+1 which completes the proof.
Corollary 2: A local maximum of (20) is attained only if every user n is associated with an
attempt probability pn =
1
|In(kn)|+ 1
. In particular, the strategy profile that attains proportionally
fair rates (i.e., the solution to (17)) must satisfy pn = 1
|In(kn)|+ 1
for all n.
Theorem 5: Let {k∗n}
N
n=1 be a given channel allocation for all users. A strategy profile
σ∗ =
{
k∗n, p
∗
n =
1
|In(k∗n)|+ 1
}N
n=1
(22)
is the unique solution to the following optimization problem:
{p∗n}
N
n=1 = arg max
{0≤pn≤1}
N
n=1
∑
n∈N :k∗n=k
logRn
(
{k∗n, pn}
N
n=1
)
∀k ∈ K .
(23)
Proof: Let Nk be the set of users that select channel k. The achievable rate of user n ∈ Nk
is given by:
Rn (σ) = un(k)pn
∏
i∈In(k)
(1− pi) ,
where In(k) is the set of user n’s neighbors that transmit over channel k. Taking log on both
sides yields:
log(Rn (σ)) = log(un(k)) + log(pn) +
∑
i∈In(k)
log (1− pi) ,
∀n ∈ Nk .
Let Lk ,
∑
n∈Nk
log(Rn (σ)) be the sum log rate on channel k. Hence,
Lk =
∑
n∈Nk

log(un(k)) + log(pn) + ∑
i∈In(k)
log (1− pi)

 .
Note that Lk is a strictly concave function of pn, n ∈ Nk. Therefore, it has a unique global
maximum. Differentiating Lk with respect to pn , n ∈ Nk, and equating to zero yields p∗n =
1
|In(k)|+1
for all n ∈ Nk, which completes the proof.
Combining Theorems 4 and 5 yields:
Corollary 3: A strategy profile σ∗ = {k∗n, p∗n}
N
n=1 is a NEP for the fairness game if {p∗n}
N
n=1
solves (23).
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Corollary 2 follows directly from the NEPs’ structure characterized in Theorem 4. We will use
the fact that attaining the global maximum of (20) implies pn = 1
|In(kn)|+ 1
for all n to design
a distributed learning algorithm that converges to the solution of (17). Corollary 3 sheds a light
on the operating points of the system. Learning algorithms used to converge to a global optimum
may spend some time at local maxima of the objective function (i.e., a NEP). Corollary 3 shows
that the local maxima of the potential function may not be so bad. Specifically, every NEP of
the fairness game can be viewed as a local proportional fairness in the sense that proportionally
fair rates are attained among all users that share channel k for all k ∈ K.
C. Distributed Cooperative Learning Algorithm
The optimization problem in (17) is a combinatorial optimization problem over a graph, and
it requires a centralized solution that uses global information which is impractical in large-scale
networks. Therefore, we propose a probabilistic approach to solve the problem in a distributed
manner. We develop a distributed cooperative learning algorithm, dubbed Noisy BR for Fairness
(NBRF) algorithm, with the goal of solving (17) using limited message exchanges between
neighbors only. NBRF is a cooperative algorithm in the sense that users make decisions with
respect to the cooperative utility that balances between their own utilities and the interference
level they cause to their neighbors.
Recall that BR dynamics may lead to local maxima of the potential function. Hence, instead
of playing purely BR, in NBRF users play noisy BR (also known as spatial adaptive play or log-
linear learning) when updating their strategies [50], [51], [67]. In NBRF, active users construct
a probability mass function (pmf) over their actions and draw their actions according to this
distribution. Typically, the BR is played with high probability, while other strategies are played
with a probability that decays exponentially fast with the myopic utility loss in order to escape
local maxima. Specifically, the pmf over the available actions is given by:
Pr((kn, pn) = (k, p)) =
eβFn(k,p,k−n,p−n)
K∑
k′=1
|In|+1∑
r=1
eβFn(k
′,1/r,k−n,p−n)
(24)
for some exploration parameter β > 0. For the ease of presentation, we assume continuous
random rates un(k) to guarantee a uniqueness of the maximizer (otherwise BRs are drawn
uniformly). Note that when β = 0 the pmf assigns equal weights on all strategies, while the
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TABLE II
NBRF ALGORITHM
1) Initialize
based on message exchanges between neighbors
each user (say n) set kn ← arg max
k
{un(k)}
and pn ← 1/ (|In(kn)|+ 1).
2) repeat (at each updating time)
3) Na ← updated set of active users
4) for n ∈ Na do
5) draw (kn, pn) randomly according
to the distribution given in (24).
6) send a packet containing (kn, pn) to
inform all neighbors In
7) end for
8) until all rates converge
probability of playing BR approaches one as β →∞ (a discussion on the setting of β based on
simulated annealing analysis [68] is provided in the end of this section). The NBRF Algorithm
is given in Table II. The set of active users in Step 3 is determined according to the distributed
mechanism described in Sec. II. Step 5 requires the active users to construct the pmf given in
(24) based on the computation of Fn(k, p, k−n, p−n) for all k = 1, ..., K, p = 1, 1/2, ..., 1/(|In|+
1) given in (18). In Step 6, active users must send complete information about their updated
strategies to their neighbors such that all users can compute their cooperative utility at each given
updating time. A similar mechanism as described in Section II can be applied, where the pilot
signal is now replaced by a packet containing complete information about the updated strategy.
Users may repeat updating strategies until their rates converge or for a predetermined number
of iterations and then stick their BR (see a discussion in the end of this section).
The following theorem shows that NBRF attains proportional fairness with an arbitrarily high
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probability as time increases.
Theorem 6: Let σNBRF (β)(t),Σ∗ be the strategy profile under NBRF (with a parameter β) at
time t and the set of strategy profiles that solves (17), respectively. For any ǫ > 0 there exists
β > 0 such that
lim
t→∞
Pr
(
σNBRF (β)(t) ∈ Σ∗
)
≥ 1− ǫ . (25)
Proof: The proof is based on the results reported in Section IV-B and the fact that a
noisy best response dynamics following (24) in exact potential games converges to a stationary
distribution of the Markov chain corresponding to the game [67]. By Theorem 3, the fairness
game with the cooperative utility Fn is an exact potential game with an exact potential function
φ given in (20). Since NBRF plays noisy BR with respect to Fn, the stationary distribution of
the strategy profile is given by [67]:
Pr(σNBRF (β) = σ) =
eβφ(σ)∑
σ˜
eβφ(σ˜)
. (26)
Next, note that the number of user n’s neighbors that transmit over channel kn, |In(kn)|, is
lower bounded by |In| for all n. Therefore, following Corollary 2, the strategy profile σ∗ that
attains the global maximum of (20) lies inside the action space played by NBRF. Therefore, for
every ǫ > 0 we can choose β > 0 sufficiently large such that the stationary distribution puts a
sufficiently high weight on the strategy profile that maximizes (20) (i.e., φ in (26)). Thus, (25)
is satisfied as time approaches infinity.
Following the proof of Theorem 6, the stationary distribution of the homogenous Markov
chain with a fixed β corresponding to the game is given by (26). As a result, as the probability
of playing BR increases (i.e., by increasing β) the probability of attaining the global maximum of
the potential function (20) increases with time. Achieving the optimal solution (i.e., letting ǫ→ 0
in (25)) requires β to approach infinity. However, increasing β too fast may push the algorithm
into a local maximum for a long time (since the probability of not playing BR is too small).
Next, let β = β(t) be a function of time. The process of increasing β(t) during the algorithm
is also known as cooling the system in simulated annealing analysis, where T (t) = 1/β(t)
represents the temperature. Following simulated annealing analysis [68], convergence to the
optimal solution is attained by increasing β(t) as β(t) = log(t)/∆, t = 1, 2, ... (∆ is a constant
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and will be discussed in the sequel). As a result, users explore strategy profiles in the beginning
of the algorithm and will stick their BR as time approaches infinity. In cases where the optimal
operating point is not unique, the algorithm may converge to one of the optimal operating
points. An alternative way is to set a piecewise constant β(t) over time as suggested in [69].
Let
{
tβk
}
be an increasing time sequence, with tβ1 = 1, where β(t) = k is kept fixed for all
tβk ≤ t ≤ t
β
k+1. Intuitively speaking, the total time between t
β
k and t
β
k+1 should be large enough,
such that the stationary Markov chain associated with the system under a fixed β(t) = k will
approach arbitrary close to a steady state (with a stationary distribution given in (26)). Following
simulated annealing analysis in [69], it suffices to let tβk+1 − tβk = ek∆. Note that the piecewise
constant update has a logarithmic order with time since β(tβk) = k ≈ log t
β
k/∆. It suffices to
set the constant ∆ to be greater than the maximal change in the objective function. Since the
maximal value of the objective function is upper bounded by N logmaxn,kn un(kn) and the
minimal value is lower bounded by N(log
(
minn,kn un(kn)
maxn |In|+1
)
− maxn |In| log 2), it suffices to set
∆ > N
(
log (maxn,kn un(kn))− log
(
minn,kn un(kn)
maxn |In|+1
)
+maxn |In| log 2) to achieve convergence.
It should be noted, however, that simulation results demonstrate fast convergence to the optimal
solution with much smaller values of ∆ under typical scenarios.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we provide numerical examples to illustrate the performance of the algorithms.
We simulated the following network: N users were randomly dispersed (uniformly) in a circle
region with a radius of 10 meters. Each user causes interference to all users in a radius of 5
meters. Every user can choose one channel for transmission among K channels. We assume
equal achievable rates un(k) = 100Mbps for all users on all channels when channels are free
(i.e., collision-free utility). We performed 1, 000 Monte-Carlo experiments and averaged the per-
formance over experiments. The randomness for each trial over which the average performance
is plotted comes from the random dynamic nature of the user updates (thus, each experiment
results in a different update dynamic and might even converge to a different equilibrium point).
We first consider the distributed rate maximization problem under the non-cooperative setting,
where each user maximizes its own rate under a constraint on the attempt probability. The
estimation of vn is based on a moving window of 100 packets. We first examine a small connected
network with N = 10 users sharing K = 2 channels, so as the centralized optimal exhaustive
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search solution (in terms of sum-log rate) can be computed and serve as a benchmark for
comparison. An illustration of the small network is depicted in Fig. 4. In Fig. 2 we present
the average rate to demonstrate the performance in terms of efficiency under fixed attempt
probabilities P = 2/3 for all users. Though optimality is not guaranteed under BR-DRM due
its greedy nature, it can be seen that under this small network model BR-DRM converges to the
optimal channel allocation (in terms of sum-log rate) in finite time and significantly improves
performance as compared to a random channel allocation. Next, we examine the case of a large
network, in which the number of users varies during time to demonstrate the robustness of the
proposed algorithm. We initialized the network size by N = 250 users, where N/2 users are
allowed to transmit with attempt probability P = 0.7 (e.g., primary or high-priority users) and
N/2 users are allowed to transmit with attempt probability P = 0.3 (e.g., secondary or low-
priority users). We set the number of channels to K = 30 (i.e., a channel represents a subsets
of subcarriers as in OFDMA or allocation to PALs in the context of spectrum sharing) (in this
case computing the optimal solution is intractable). We first increase the network size by adding
10 users after 100 iterations. Then, we increase the network size more aggressively by adding
another 40 users. It can be seen that BR-DRM converges to the equilibrium points very fast,
and significantly outperforms the naive algorithm for all time instants. Note that we can further
increase the robustness of the algorithms by allowing users to update their strategies only when
they improve their rates by more than a predefined value.
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Fig. 2. Average rate as a function of the number of iterations. A wireless network containing 10 users and 2 channels. Each
user transmits with an attempt probability 2/3.
Second, we consider the cooperative setting, where the goal is to find a channel allocation
and attempt probabilities in a distributed manner so as to attain proportionally fair rates among
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Fig. 3. Average rate as a function of the number of iterations under a time varying network size. N = 250, 260, 300 for
1 ≤ t < 100, 100 ≤ t < 200, 200 ≤ t ≤ 300, respectively (where t denotes the iteration index). In the top figure, the average
rate of N/2 users with attempt probability 0.7 is presented. In the bottom figure, the average rate of N/2 users with attempt
probability 0.3 is presented.
users. We compare the NBRF algorithm, given in Table II, with the random channel allocation
scheme, where the optimal attempt probabilities were set under any random channel allocation
(i.e., pn = 1/(|In(kn)|+1) for all n). In the NBRF algorithm, we set β = log t (where t = 1, 2, ...
indicates the iteration number) to construct the pmf in Step 6. We first examine a small connected
network with N = 10 users sharing K = 2 channels, so as the centralized optimal exhaustive
search solution can be computed and serve as a benchmark for comparison. An illustration of
the small network is depicted in Fig. 4. In Fig. 5 we present the average log rate to demonstrate
the performance in terms of proportional fairness and also the average rate to demonstrate
the achievable effective rates. It can be seen that NBRF significantly improves performance
as compared to a random channel allocation (even though the attempt probabilities are optimal
given any random channel allocation) in terms of both fairness and efficiency. It can be seen that
NBRF approaches the optimal centralized solution as time increases. This result demonstrates
the efficiency of the proposed distributed learning algorithm in achieving the global proportional
fairness in the network.
Next, we consider a large network, in which the number of users varies during time to
demonstrate the robustness of the proposed NBRF algorithm. We initialized the network size by
N = 80 users, and set the number of channels to K = 10 (in this case computing the optimal
solution is intractable). We first increase the network size by adding 5 users after 200 iterations.
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Then, we increase the network size more aggressively by adding another 15 users. It can be
seen that NBRF approaches the equilibrium points very fast and significantly outperforms the
random channel allocation for all time instants.
Fig. 4. An illustration of a small connected network with 10 users spatially distributed in a circle area of radius 10 meters. The
users share 2 channels. Each pair of users with distance less than 2 meters (represented by an edge) cause mutual interference
when transmitting simultaneously over the same channel.
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Fig. 5. Average sum-log rate and average rate as a function of the number of iterations. A wireless network containing 10
users and 2 channels.
VI. CONCLUSION
The distributed optimization problem over multiple collision channels shared by spatially
distributed users was considered. We examined both the non-cooperative and cooperative set-
tings. Under the non-cooperative setting, we developed a distributed learning algorithm for the
distributed rate maximization problem, in which each user maximizes its own rate irrespective of
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Fig. 6. Average sum-log rate and average rate as a function of the number of iterations under a time varying network size.
N = 80, 85, 100 for 1 ≤ t < 200, 200 ≤ t < 400, 400 ≤ t ≤ 600, respectively (where t denotes the iteration index). A wireless
network containing 80− 100 users and 10 channels.
other user utilities. Convergence was proved using the theory of best-response potential games.
Under the cooperative setting, we developed a distributed cooperative learning algorithm to
achieve the global proportional fairness in the networks. While direct computation of the optimal
solution is impractical in large-scale networks, we showed that the proposed distributed algorithm
converges to the global optimum with high probability as time increases. Simulation results
demonstrated strong performance of the algorithms.
Future research directions are convergence time analysis of the proposed algorithms, analyzing
their performance under malicious/malfunctioning nodes, and extensions of the NEPs efficiency
analysis under the non-cooperative setting.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Occurrence of Cycles in the DRM Game Under Better-Response Dynamics
In Theorem 1 in Section IV-A we have shown that the DRM game is a best-response potential
game for M ≥ 1 (i.e., no cycles occur when a best-response dynamics is implemented). Here,
we provide an example that shows that cycles may occur when a better-response dynamics is
implemented for M > 1. Assume N = 2 users, K = 4 channels, M = 2 and P1 = P2 = 0.5.
Consider the following utility matrix:
U ,

u1(1) u1(2) u1(3) u1(4)
u2(1) u2(2) u2(3) u2(4)

 =

1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1

 (27)
DRAFT
31
and an initial strategy profile:
σ(0) ,

P1 P1 0 0
0 P2 P2 0

 =

0.5 0.5 0 0
0 0.5 0.5 0

 . (28)
Next, we present a better-response dynamics which results in a cycle. Assume updating time t1
and let user 1 update its strategy by switching from channels 1, 2 (with rate 0.5 ·1+0.25 ·2 = 1)
to channels 3, 4 (with a higher rate 0.5 · 2 + 0.25 · 1 = 1.25):
σ(1) =

0 0 0.5 0.5
0 0.5 0.5 0

 . (29)
At updating time t2 user 2 updates its strategy by switching from channels 2, 3 (with rate
0.5 · 1 + 0.25 · 2 = 1) to channels 1, 4 (with a higher rate 0.5 · 2 + 0.25 · 1 = 1.25):
σ(2) =

 0 0 0.5 0.5
0.5 0 0 0.5

 . (30)
At updating time t3 user 1 updates its strategy by switching from channels 3, 4 (with rate
0.5 · 1 + 0.25 · 2 = 1) to channels 1, 2 (with a higher rate 0.5 · 2 + 0.25 · 1 = 1.25):
σ(3) =

0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 0 0.5

 (31)
At updating time t4 user 2 updates its strategy by switching from channels 1, 4 (with rate
0.5 · 1 + 0.25 · 2 = 1) to channels 2, 3 (with a higher rate 0.5 · 2 + 0.25 · 1 = 1.25):
σ(4) =

0.5 0.5 0 0
0 0.5 0.5 0

 = σ(0) . (32)
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider two strategies for user n0, σ(1)n0 = (k
(1)
n0 , Pn0), σ
(2)
n0 = (k
(2)
n0 , Pn0), and fix the strategy
profile for all other users σ−n0 . Throughout the proof, the superscript (i) refers to the user
strategies given that user n0 plays strategy σ(i)n0 , for i = 1, 2. The term In(k, k′, P, σ−n,n0) refers
to the log-interference function (4) when user n chooses channel k, user n0 plays strategy (k′, P ),
and all other users except users n, n0 play strategy profile σ−n,n0 .
Step 1: The Improvement in User n0’s Rate:
Assume that σ(2)n0 is a BR strategy for user n0, i.e.,
Rn0(σ
(2)
n0
, σ−n0)− Rn0(σ
(1)
n0
, σ−n0) ≥ 0 (33)
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for all σ(1)n0 , such that k
(1)
n0 ∈ KM . Let
{
k
(2)
n0,1
, k
(2)
n0,2
, ..., k
(2)
n0,K
}
be a permutation of {1, ..., K}
such that:
un0(k
(2)
n0,1
)vn0(k
(2)
n0,1
, σ−n0) ≥ un0(k
(2)
n0,2
)vn0(k
(2)
n0,2
, σ−n0)
≥ · · · ≥ un0(k
(2)
n0,K
)vn0(k
(2)
n0,K
, σ−n0) .
(34)
Following (7), the BR channel-selection k(2)n0 is given by:
k(2)n0 =
{
k
(2)
n0,1
, k
(2)
n0,2
, ..., k
(2)
n0,M
}
. (35)
Next, arrange the entries of σ(1)n0 =
{
k
(1)
n0,1, k
(1)
n0,2, ..., k
(1)
n0,K
}
such that:
un0(k
(1)
n0,1)vn0(k
(1)
n0,1, σ−n0) ≥ un0(k
(1)
n0,2)vn0(k
(1)
n0,2, σ−n0)
≥ · · · ≥ un0(k
(1)
n0,M
)vn0(k
(1)
n0,M
, σ−n0) .
(36)
As a result, by the construction we have:
un0(k
(2)
n0,i
)vn0(k
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0) ≥ un0(k
(1)
n0,i
)vn0(k
(1)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
∀i = 1, ...,M .
(37)
Next, define
k˜
(1)
n0 , k
(1)
n0 \ k
(2)
n0 =
{
k˜
(1)
n0,1, ..., k˜
(1)
n0,L
}
,
k˜
(2)
n0 , k
(2)
n0 \ k
(1)
n0 =
{
k˜
(2)
n0,1, ..., k˜
(2)
n0,L
}
.
(38)
For example, if user n0 selects channels k(1)n0 = {1, 2, 3} and k
(2)
n0 = {3, 4, 5} according to
strategies σ(1)n0 and σ
(2)
n0 , respectively, then k˜
(1)
n0 = {1, 2}, k˜
(2)
n0 = {4, 5}, and L = 2. Note that
k˜
(1)
n0 , k˜
(2)
n0 have the same cardinality (say L , |k˜(1)n0 | = |k˜(2)n0 | ≤ M) and denote the differences in
the chosen channels under strategies σ(1)n0 , σ
(2)
n0 (i.e., k˜(1)n0 ∩ k˜(2)n0 = ∅). We arrange
{
k˜
(i)
n0,1, ..., k˜
(i)
n0,L
}
such that:
un0(k˜
(i)
n0,1
)vn0(k˜
(i)
n0,1
, σ−n0) ≥ un0(k˜
(i)
n0,2
)vn0(k˜
(i)
n0,2
, σ−n0)
≥ · · · ≥ un0(k˜
(i)
n0,L
)vn0(k˜
(i)
n0,L
, σ−n0) ,
(39)
for i = 1, 2.
By the construction and using the monotonicity of the logarithm, we obtain
∆R˜n0,i
(
k˜
(1)
n0,i
, k˜
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0
)
,
log(un(k˜
(2)
n0,i
))− In(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
−
(
log(un(k˜
(1)
n0,i
))− In(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
)
≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., L .
(40)
Step 2: The difference in the Potential Function:
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Next, to prove the theorem we need to show that
φ(σ(2)n0 , σ−n0)− φ(σ
(1)
n0
, σ−n0) ≥ 0 (41)
The difference in the proposed function (12) ∆φ is given by:
∆φ
(
σ
(1)
n0 , σ
(2)
n0 , σ−n0
)
, φ
(
σ(2)n0 , σ−n0
)
− φ
(
σ(1)n0 , σ−n0
)
=
N∑
n=1
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
M∑
i=1
(
log un(k
(2)
n,i)−
In(k
(2)
n,i , σ
(2)
−n)
2
)
−
N∑
n=1
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
M∑
i=1
(
log un(k
(1)
n,i)−
In(k
(1)
n,i , σ
(1)
−n)
2
)
(a)
=
L∑
i=1

 ∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(1)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
(
log un(k˜
(1)
n0,i
)−
In(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, k˜
(2)
n0,i
, Pn0 , σ−n,n0)
2
)
+
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(2)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
(
log un(k˜
(2)
n0,i
)−
In(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, k˜
(2)
n0,i
, Pn0 , σ−n,n0)
2
)
+ log
(
1
1− Pn0
)(
log un0(k˜
(2)
n0,i
)−
In(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
2
)
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−
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(1)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
(
log un(k˜
(1)
n0,i
)−
In(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, k˜
(1)
n0,i
, Pn0, σ−n,n0)
2
)
−
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(2)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
(
log un(k˜
(2)
n0,i
)−
In(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, k˜
(1)
n0,i
, Pn0, σ−n,n0)
2
)
− log
(
1
1− Pn0
)
×(
log un0(k˜
(1)
n0,i
)−
In(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
2
)]
,
L∑
i=1
f(i) .
Equality (a) follows since only users in In0 that transmit over channels k˜(1)n0,i, k˜
(2)
n0,i
experience a
change in their interference level. Thus, it suffices to show that every term in the summation is
positive (i.e., f(i) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., L). After rearranging terms we have:
f(i) = −
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(1)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
In(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, k˜
(1)
n0,i
, Pn0, σ−n,n0) + log(1− Pn0)
2
−
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(2)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
In(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, k˜
(2)
n0,i
, Pn0, σ−n,n0)
2
+ log
(
1
1− Pn0
)(
log un0(k˜
(2)
n0,i
)−
In0(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
2
)
+
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(1)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
In(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, k˜
(1)
n0,i
, Pn0, σ−n,n0)
2
+
∑
n∈In0 :k˜
(2)
n0,i
∈kn
log
(
1
1− Pn
)
×
In(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, k˜
(2)
n0,i
, Pn0, σ−n,n0) + log(1− Pn0)
2
− log
(
1
1− Pn0
)(
log un0(k˜
(1)
n0,i
)−
In0(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
2
)
,
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where the last equality follows by the fact the user n0 contributes − log(1 − Pn0) to the log-
interference when transmitting over a channel. Hence, after rearranging terms we have:
f(i) = log
(
1
1− Pn0
)
In0(k˜
(1)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
2
− log
(
1
1− Pn0
)
In0(k˜
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0)
2
+ log
(
1
1− Pn0
)(
log un0(k˜
(2)
n0,i
)−
In0(k
(2), σ−n0)
2
)
− log
(
1
1− Pn0
)(
log un0(k˜
(1)
n0,i
)−
In0(k
(1), σ−n0)
2
)
= log
(
1
1− Pn0
)
∆R˜n0,i
(
k˜
(1)
n0,i
, k˜
(2)
n0,i
, σ−n0
)
≥ 0
for all i. Hence, (11) follows. Furthermore, φ(σ) is upper bounded by φ(σ) ≤ M∑Nn=1 log ( 11−Pn
)
maxk log (un(
As a result, φ(σ) in (12) is a bounded best-response potential function of the DRM game which
completes the proof. 
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Consider two strategies for user n0, σ(1)n0 = (kn0 = k(1), pn0 = p(1)), σ
(2)
n0 = (kn0 = k
(2), pn0 =
p(2)), and fix the strategy profile for all other users σ−n0 . Throughout the proof, the superscript
(i), refers to the user strategies given that user n0 plays strategy σ(i)n0 , for i = 1, 2. The term
In(kn, k
(i), p(i), σ−n,n0) refers to the log-interference function (4) when user n chooses channel
kn, user n0 plays strategy (k(i), p(i)), and all other users except users n, n0 play strategy σ−n,n0 .
The difference in the payoff function ∆R˜n0 is given by:
Fn0(σ
(2)
n , σ−n)− Fn0(σ
(1)
n , σ−n)
=
[
log
(
un0(k
(2))p(2)
)
− In0
(
k(2), σ−n0
)
− log
(
1
1− p(2)
) ∣∣In0(k(2))∣∣
]
−
[
log
(
un0(k
(1))p(1)
)
− In0
(
k(1), σ−n0
)
− log
(
1
1− p(1)
) ∣∣In0(k(1))∣∣
]
, ∆Fn0
(
σ(1), σ(2), σ−n0
)
.
We prove the theorem for k(1) 6= k(2). The case where k(1) = k(2) follows similarly with minor
modifications. The difference in the proposed function (20) ∆φ is given by:
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∆φ
(
σ
(1)
n0 , σ
(2)
n0 , σ−n0
)
, φ
(
σ(2)n0 , σ−n0
)
− φ
(
σ(1)n0 , σ−n0
)
=
∑
n 6=n0
[
log un(kn) + log pn − In(kn, k
(2), p(2), σ−n,n0)
]
+ log un0(k
(2)) + log p(2) − In0(k
(2), σ−n0)
−
∑
n 6=n0
[
log un(kn) + log pn − In(kn, k
(1), p(1), σ−n,n0)
]
+ log un0(k
(1)) + log p(1) − In0(k
(1), σ−n0)
= −
∑
n∈In0:kn=k(1)
log(1− p(1))
+
∑
n∈In0:kn=k(2)
log(1− p(2))
+ log un0(k
(2)) + log p(2) − In0(k
(2), σ−n0)
−
(
log un0(k
(1)) + log p(1) − In0(k
(1), σ−n0)
)
= − log(1− p(1))
∣∣In0(k(1))∣∣+ log(1− p(2)) ∣∣In0(k(2))∣∣
+ log un0(k
(2)) + log p(2) − In0(k
(2), σ−n0)
−
(
log un0(k
(1)) + log p(1) − In0(k
(1), σ−n0)
)
= ∆Fn0
(
σ(1), σ(2), σ−n0
)
,
where we used the facts that only users in In0 that transmit over channels k(1) and k(2) experience
a change in their interference level, and the contributions of user n0 to the log-interference
experienced by its neighbors that transmit over channels k(1) and k(2) are − log(1 − p(1)) and
− log(1−p(2)), respectively. Hence, (11) follows. Furthermore, φ(σ) is upper bounded as follows:
φ(σ) <
∑N
n=1maxk log (un(k)). As a result, φ(σ) in (20) is a bounded exact potential function
of the fairness game which completes the proof. 
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